Simulation of the Costs and Benefits of Delayed Retirement: Evidence from Vietnam by Nguyen, Cuong
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Simulation of the Costs and Benefits of





MPRA Paper No. 106180, posted 19 Feb 2021 06:24 UTC
1 
 
Simulation of the Costs and Benefits of Delayed Retirement: 
Evidence from Vietnam 
 
 




Vietnam is experiencing one of the fastest rates of population ageing in the world, yet has a 
low retirement age at 55 for women and 60 for men. This paper identifies the impacts of 
raising the retirement age and assesses how these would translate into either net costs or net 
gains for the Vietnamese economy in the long term. First, the paper uses national and 
household-level data to assess how a change in the employment rate of older workers would 
impact the employment status and wages of younger workers and impact the school 
attendance of their grandchildren. Second, this paper conducts a cost-benefit analysis to 
assess the net annual benefit of raising the retirement age according to four policy scenarios. 
This calculation is used to project the net benefits of each scenario over 33 years. The paper 
finds that increasing the employment rate will not impact the employment rate of younger 
workers, and will only negatively impact their wages in households where an older woman 
would stop helping with housework in order to resume formal employment. Given these 
findings, this paper concludes that raising the retirement age will result in a net gain in all 
four policy scenarios and that gains will increase the higher the retirement age is raised. The 
gains from raising women’s retirement age will exceed those of raising men’s age in the long 
term as the female share of the formal workforce continues to grow.  
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1. Introduction  
Vietnam’s 50 million workers are a cornerstone of its economic success. The impressive 
economic growth rates and plunging poverty rates can be attributed to the on-going structural 
transformation from an agriculturally-based economy toward manufacturing and services 
and the shift of workers out of low-productivity primary production and into higher 
productivity manufacturing and services, particularly into wage employment. Demographics 
trends may threaten the pace of progress, though. Vietnam is an aging society. As of 2018, 
the share of the population that is of prime working age (15-64) has begun to decline, in favor 
of the continued increase in the share of workers age 65 or older. This puts Vietnam’s 
economic growth at risk solely in that the number of potential workers will begin to decrease 
in the foreseeable future. 
The current pension laws exacerbate the problem since they encourage more skilled 
workers to leave the labor force long before their productive lives have ended. Women are 
eligible to retire and collect pensions (hereafter referred to as the “retirement age”) at age 55 
and men at age 60. Transition matrices show that older workers in wage- and benefit-paying 
jobs begin to abandon work in the 55+ age category, while those who do not have access to 
pension benefits continue working. Vietnam has a low retirement age. A normal norm for 
minimum age for pension collection is 65 years old. Vietnamese people’s longevity is on par 
with developed countries, averaging 75.8 years.  
The cost of the low retirement age goes beyond the fiscal costs of paying out pensions 
for an average of 20 years (15 years for men), incurring economic costs. Increasing the 
retirement age can reduce the social pensions paid to older people (Nguyen, 2013; 2020). If 
productive women retire at age 55, they are not producing output, and thus no longer 
contributing to economic growth. Since jobs expand with the labor force, this is, indeed, lost 
output and not simply a substitution of older workers by younger workers. Thus the 
government of Vietnam consider to increase the retirement age to 62 for men and 60 for 
women.  
One concern with retirement age delay is a decrease in the labor market participation 
of young people. Under assumptions of the fixed labor demand and perfect substitution 
between old and young workers, retirement age delay reduces employment for younger 
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people. However, these assumptions might not hold (e.g., Kalwij et al. 2010; Böheim, 2014). 
The empirical findings are mixed. Several studies such as Staubli and Zweimüller (2013), 
Boeri et al. (2016), and Bertoni and Brunello (2017) show a positive effect of delayed 
retirement on employment of older people and a negative effect on youth. However, other 
empirical studies do not find a significant effect of the employment of older people on labor 
market outcomes of other age groups (e.g., Jousten et al. 2010; Kalwij et al. 2010; Munnell 
and Wu, 2013; Böheim, 2014). In this study, we also examine this issue for the case of 
Vietnam.   
Extended retirement age increases the number of older people working in the formal 
sector. Given the number of employers unchanged in at least the short-term, the increase in 
the labor supply of older people can reduce the labor price (the wage) and labor supply of 
younger people. As a result, extended retirement age can cause unemployment of young 
people. However, several studies argue that this view only holds under assumptions of the 
fixed labor demand or amount of work and perfect substitution between old and young 
workers. When these assumptions do not hold, the effect of delayed retirement age will be 
different.  
The empirical findings are mixed. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) and Bertoni and 
Brunello (2017) show a positive effect of delayed retirement on employment of older people 
and a negative effect on youth employment in Austria and Italy, respectively. Boeri et al. 
(2016) also confirm this negative effect of delayed retirement youth employment in Italy. 
Vestad (2013) find that early retirees are replaced by youngers in Norway.    
Böheim (2014) argues that “Keeping older workers in the workforce longer not only 
doesn’t harm the employment of younger workers, but might actually help both”. Empirical 
data do not show a trade-off between young employment and employment of older people. 
Younger and older workers are complements for each other rather than substitutes. Gruber 
and Wise (2010) find a positive correlation between employment of older people and 
employment of younger ones. Jousten et al. (2010) do not find a link between elderly 
retirement and employment the young and the prime-age populations in Belgium. Similarly, 
Munnell, A., & Wu (2013) do not find a significant effect of the employment of older people 
on labor market outcomes of other age groups in the US as well China. Burtless (2013) find 
a little evidence that aging workforce affects productivity. Kalwij et al. (2010) does not 
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support the hypothesis that employment of the young and old are substitutes and finds some 
minor complementarities. This suggests that encouraging later retirement will have no 
adverse effect on youth employment.  
 Most previous studies focus on the high-income countries. The effect of delayed in 
low- and middle-income countries might be different for several reasons. Firstly, the informal 
sector in the low- and middle-income countries is large. The pensions are applied for the 
formal sector, and workers in the formal section are more lily to be skilled. There is still a 
large room for the growth of the formal sector. As a result, there is a need for the skilled labor 
and the growth of the formal sector can absorb the older workers. Secondly, in low- and 
middle-income countries, older people, especially female ones, are more likely to do 
housework and take care of children.  Yu et al. (2019) find a positive effect of grandparental 
childcare on young females’ labor force participation. For the case of Vietnam, Dang et al. 
(2019) conclude that child care (kindergarten attendance) helps mothers as well as fathers 
participate more into labor market in Vietnam. This suggests that if grandparents can take 
care of children, parents are more likely to be employed. Delayed retirement age might 
reduce the labor market participation of younger household members, especially female ones.   
The objective of this study is to measure the costs and identify the trade-offs of 
Vietnam’s low retirement age. It explores several research questions as follows: 
1. What are the current situations of workers in the formal and informal sector in 
Vietnam? Are there gender differences? 
2. To what extent does employment of older people affect employment of young 
people in Vietnam? 
3. What is the estimated incremental GDP contribution of longer female labor force 
participation relative to different scenarios: retirement age at 60 for women, 62 and 
65 for both men and women? What is the cost today and what is the cost over the next 
generation (30 years) given the demographic profile and the shifting trends in 
pensions eligibility (as the labor force increasingly formalizes)? 
5. What is the estimated cost of foregone labor by other age groups if older workers 
remain in the labor force? 
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The report is structured into five sections. The second section describes the data sets 
used in this study. The third section estimates the effect of labor market participation of older 
age people on younger people. The fourth section projects the benefit of extended retirement 
age over time. Finally, the fifth section concludes.  
2. Data set and descriptive analysis 
This study relies on three recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (henceforth 
referred to as VHLSS) in 2012, 2014, and 2016. The VHLSSs were conducted by the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical assistances from the World Bank. The 
sample size of each VHLSS is 45 thousand households, representative at the provincial level.  
The surveys contain detailed information on individuals, households and commune 
data. Individual-level data include basic demography, employment and labor force 
participation, education, health. Household-level data include income, expenditure, housing, 
fixed assets and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs. 
In addition, there are commune-level data including general economic conditions and aid 
programs, non-farm employment local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, 
and social affairs.  
Table 1 present an overall picture of employment of people aged from 15 in Vietnam. 
The percentage of people who have worked during the past 12 months in the population 
(excluding students) was 83% in 2016. 17% of people were not working because of different 
reasons such as ‘health problems’, ‘housework’, ‘don’t find a job’, and others. The 
unemployment rate (unemployed are those who cannot find a job during the past year) was 
very low, less than 1% in 2016. The proportion of working people with a wage job increased 
from 38.7% in 2012 to 41.6% in 2016. The proportion of working people having a skilled 
work and a formal job also slightly increased. In this study, a job in the formal sector is 
defined as a job with social insurance. Formal job means better and long-term employment.     
Males have a higher rate of working as well as the average number of working hours 
than females. The different is quite similar in 2012 and 2016. There is a large gender 
difference in the rate of having wage job. In 2016, 48% of males had a wage job, while this 
rate was only 35% for females. Males also had a higher rate of skilled work than females, 
though the gap in this variable was smaller than the gap in the rate of having a wage job. 
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However, it’s interesting that females had a higher rate of formal jobs than males, and the 
gap was widened over time. In 2016, 20% of working females had a formal job, while 17% 
of males had a formal job. Possibly, women want to have a stable job with social insurance, 
and they are more likely to work in the textile, garment and footwear sectors, which employ 
more formal workers.  
Table 1. Employment in Vietnam 
Variables 
 2012   2016  
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Have a work (excluding students) (%) 88.2 79.9 83.9 87.7 78.8 83.1 
Number of working hours during the 
past month 
185.3 173.5 179.5 187.3 175.3 181.4 
Have a wage job (%) 45.4 31.9 38.7 47.7 35.4 41.6 
Have a skilled work (%) 56.4 49.8 53.2 58.0 53.1 55.6 
Have social insurance (%) 16.0 16.3 16.2 17.3 19.9 18.6 
Monthly wage (thousand VND) 4182.4 3521.8 3914.8 5094.1 4335.3 4776.9 
Hourly wage (thousand VND) 24.2 20.6 22.8 28.4 24.3 26.7 
Note: This table is computed for people aged from 15 (excluding people who are studying). 
Working hour, wage job, skilled work, job with social insurance, and wage are computed for working people. 
The wage is measured in the price of 2016.  
Source: VHLSSs 2012 and 2016 
 
The retirement-aged population makes up a special demographic in the workforce. 
The employment rate for men continues to be higher than that of women for all age groups, 
yet for both genders, employment rates drop consistently as workers age. Though 90.5 
percent of workers are still employed at age 50-54 in 2016, this share dropped to 57.6 percent 
for workers aged 65-69 (Table 2). The number of hours worked and wages see a similar 
decline for older worker. These trends are to be expected as workers succumb to old age, 
sickness, and disability—a fact which is reflected in the growing share of workers of both 
genders who reported these as their primary reasons for not working as they get older (Table 
3). 
Formal workers, however, retire much earlier and at higher rates than workers that 
will not receive a pension, as seen by employment rates of formal workers drop substantially 
when they hit retirement age.  The share of women working in formal jobs drops from 10.1 
percent of those aged 50-54 to 2.4 of those aged 55-59, whereas the share of men working in 
formal jobs drops from 13.3 percent among those aged 55-59 to 4.8 percent among those 
aged 60-64 (Table 4). Notably, the share of men working in formal jobs is almost unchanged 
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between those aged 50-54 and 55-59, even as the employment rate of their female co-workers 
drops as they hit their earlier retirement age. All of these factors suggest that the retirement 
age for men and women in formal jobs is a significant driver of their decision to stop working 
in their primary. That said, what this data does not capture is the share of people formerly 
employed in formal jobs that shifted to other forms of employment—such as self-
employment—after retirement. This, coupled with the fact employment rates remain high in 
informal sectors where there is no retirement age or pension to encourage retirement, reflects 
how a large share retirement-aged men and women are largely capable of continuing to work 
past their respective retirement ages     
Table 2. Employment by age groups and gender, 2016 
Variables Gender Aged 50-54 Aged 55-59 Aged 60-64 Aged 65-69 
Percentage of working 
people 
Female 87.5 78.1 67.4 53.3 
Male 93.6 87.3 75.5 63.3 
Total  90.5 82.5 71.1 57.6 
Percentage of people 
having a wage job 
Female 23.3 13.8 10.6 7.8 
Male 39.6 34.7 21.2 12.7 
Total  31.5 24.3 15.8 10.2 
Percentage of people 
having a skilled work 
Female 46.0 39.8 37.2 35.5 
Male 57.9 55.0 47.1 42.9 
Total  52.0 47.5 42.0 39.0 
Percentage of having a 
social insurance job 
Female 10.1 2.4 0.7 0.3 
Male 13.7 13.3 4.8 1.5 
Total  11.9 7.9 2.7 0.9 
Number of working 
hours during the past 
month 
Female 170.8 152.9 130.8 116.4 
Male 183.8 168.5 146.2 125.5 
Total  177.3 160.8 138.3 120.7 
Monthly wage 
(thousand VND) 
Female 4385.1 3134.4 2371.0 2075.8 
Male 5203.0 5176.7 4218.4 3069.3 
Total  4903.1 4604.2 3583.8 2666.4 
Hourly wage 
(thousand VND) 
Female 26.2 20.1 19.5 14.2 
Male 30.0 31.4 28.0 23.8 
Total  28.6 28.2 25.1 19.9 
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
An important issue is the receipt of contributory pension among older people. Males 
are more likely to receive pensions than females (Figure 1). For peopled age 55-59, the 
proportion of receiving pension is higher for women than men, since the retirement age is 55 
for women and 60 for men. If the retirement age is extended to 60 for women, those who are 
aged 55-59 and have pension will be affected. If the retirement age is increased to 65 for both 
women and men, women aged 55-59 and men aged 60-64 who have been working in the 





Figure 1. Percentage of people with contributory pensions 
 
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
 
3. Assessing the impact of a raised retirement age 
In this section, we look at four different ways in which raising the retirement age could impact 
the labor force, with the goal of understanding what we should consider as a potential cost or 
benefit of such a policy. First, we calculate the impact on the pensioners themselves, 
conducting an impact-evaluation analysis to predict what share of them we could expect to 
continue working if the retirement age were higher, as well as what we could expect their 
average wages to be. Next, we look at how the inclusion of these additional workers could 
affect the labor force, using VHLSS data to assess the relationship between higher 
employment rates among retirement-aged workers and younger workers in the national labor 
force, younger workers within their household, and children within their households.  
3.1. Impact on younger worker employment 
In Vietnam, the current retirement age is the same for all the women as well as for all the 
men. There is no variation in the retirement age across any dimension. The retirement age is 
not yet extended. Thus, we cannot estimate the effect of retirement age on employment and 



























people on employment and wage of younger people. This effect indicates cost of delayed 
retirement age. More specifically, we will estimate the effect of the proportion of people aged 
55-64 working or having a wage job on the working of younger people. We will use the 
provincial-level data which are computed from the VHLSSs from 2002 to 2016. 
Estimation of the impact of a socio-economic factor is very challenging due to the 
endogeneity problem. To examine the effect of the proportion of employment of older people 
on employment of younger people, we will employ panel-data regressions. More specifically, 
an outcome variable, i.e., the proportion of working of people aged 16-24, is assumed to be 
a function of the proportion of working of older people and other explanatory variables as 
follows: 
                    
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝛽3 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛽4 + 𝑇𝑡𝛽5 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,          
where𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an outcome of interest (the proportion of working or the proportion of wage-
paying job) of province i in year t. 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the share of older people who are working (or 
having a wage job) in province i in year t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables including 
the population of different age groups, education and age of the population groups, the share 
of urban population, the share of ethnic minority population. 𝑇𝑡 is a vector of year dummies. 
The error term is decomposed into time-invariant component 𝑣𝑖 and time-variant component 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The effect of the current employment and lagged employment of older people on younger 
people’s employment are measured by 𝛽2 and 𝛽3, respectively.  
As mentioned, the estimation of urbanization can be biased due to the correlation 
between employment of older people and errors. Finding a convincing instrument for 
employment of older people is challenging. In this study, we first use panel data to eliminate 
the time-invariant component 𝑣𝑖 by the first-differencing of equation. A widely-used 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Holtz-Eakin and others (1988), and 
Arellano and Bond (1991) are used in this study. The GMM-type instruments for the above 
differenced endogenous variables are higher order lags of these variables.  
Figure 2 presents the proportion of people aged 55-64 having a wage job and the 
proportion of younger people having a wage job of provinces over during 2002-2010, which 
are computed from the VHLSSs 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. It 
shows a strongly positive correlation between the proportion of having a wage job of older 
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and younger people. Provinces which have a higher rate of older people with a wage job also 
have a higher rate of young people with a wage job.  
Figure 2. Employment of people aged 55-64 and employment of younger people 
Employment of people aged 55-64 and employment of 
younger people aged 15-24 
Employment of people aged 55-64 and employment of 
younger people aged 15-24 
  
Employment of people aged 55-64 and employment of 
younger people aged 15-24 
Employment of people aged 55-64 and employment of 
younger people aged 15-24 
  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs from 2002 to 2016. 
To estimate the effect of the employment of older people, we use the GMM model. 
Table 3 reports only the coefficients of the employment rate of the older people and its lag. 
We estimate the effect of both the proportion of working and the proportion of having a wage 
job of older people on employment of different age groups. It shows that most coefficients 
are positive, and all the coefficients are not statistically significant. It suggests that there is 
no evidence on that substitution between older workers and younger ones. Hence, increasing 
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Proportion of people aged 55-64 are 
working 
0.2833 0.3616 0.1947 0.2386 
(0.679) (0.284) (0.194) (0.403) 
Lag of the proportion of people aged 55-64 
are working 
0.0969 0.0689 0.0264 0.1632 
(0.312) (0.130) (0.089) (0.185) 
Proportion of people aged 55-64 having a 
wage job 
0.7899 0.0532 0.2603 0.6511 
(1.045) (0.632) (0.664) (0.491) 
Lag of the proportion of people aged 55-64 
having a wage job 
-0.2054 0.0097 0.1775 -0.0078 
(0.860) (0.520) (0.547) (0.404) 
Control variables include log of population of different age groups, the average schooling years and the average age 
of different age groups, the proportion of urban population, and the proportion of ethnic minority population.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: estimation from VHLSSs from 2002 to 2016 
3.2. Impact on younger worker employment (within household) 
This section examines the effect of working of older people on employment of young people 
in the same households. We use the individual-level data from VHLSSs 2010 to 2016. We 
compare employment of young members in households in which older household members 
(aged 55-64) have a wage job and employment of young members in households in which 
older household members do not have a wage job.  
We use regression to estimate the effect of the labor market participation of older 
members on younger members. The econometric model is written as follows: 
                                  
𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛽1 + 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑗𝛽3 + 𝑂𝑗𝛽4 + 𝐻𝑗𝛽5 + 𝑢𝑖,          
where𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an outcome of interest (employment variables) of younger member (aged below 
55) i in household j. 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗 is a dummy indicating the oldest member aged 55-64 having a 
wage job or participating in the labor market. Xi,j is a vector of control variables of younger 
people, while Oj is a vector of control variables of older people. 𝐻𝑗  are household-level 
control variables. We first estimate the effect of the labor market participation of male older 
member, and then female older member. In few households, there might be more than one 
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member aged 55-64. Thus, we use the employment status of the oldest member (but still aged 
55-64).  
The main problem in estimating 𝛽2 is the endogeneity of the working of older people. 
It means that individuals living in a household in which an older person is working are 
different from individuals living in another household in which an older person is not 
working. Omitted variables in equation (1), such as household economic characteristics, can 
affect working statuses of both younger and older people. To solve this problem, we use 
instrumental-variable regression (Wooldridge, 2010). A valid instrument should be 
correlated with working status of older people but not working status of younger people. In 
this study, we use age of older people as the instrument. This variable strongly affects the 
employment of the older people, but we expect that this variable does not affect the 
employment of the older people in the same household.  
It should be noted that we also tried the regression discontinuity estimation which 
compare employment of younger household members among households with older people 
aged around 55 for men and 60 for women. This is the retirement age, and the proportion of 
people working in the formal section should decrease significantly after this age. However, 
there is not a jump in the proportion of formal jobs at this age. Thus, we cannot use this 
estimation method.   
 As mentioned, there can be more than one older member in a family. To examine this 
issue, we regress employment and wage of younger people on the variable ‘the number of 
older people with a wage job’ living in the same families (In Table 9 above, we estimate the 
effect of employment of the oldest member). In addition, if an older member is not working, 
she or he can do housework. In the 2014 and 2016 VHLSSs there is a question on whether a 
household member is not working because of housework. Thus, we also estimate the effect 
of ‘older people doing housework’ on employment of younger household members. It should 
be noted that we use age as the instrument for the wage job of older people. Thus age cannot 
be used as the instrument for the variable ‘doing housework’. We are not able to find a good 
instrument for the variable of ‘doing housework’. The estimate of the effect of ‘doing 
housework’ might be biased though we control a number of explanatory variables. The result 
should be interpreted with caution. It can measure the association between doing housework 
and employment of younger people instead of causality.  
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Table 4 reports the coefficients of the main variables of interest, which are the 
working and doing housework of older people. We estimate the effect for separate samples 
of women and men. It shows that the number of older people with a wage job in the family 
does not have a significant effect on employment as well as wage of younger household 
members. The effect is small and not significant in the three samples of older people. These 
findings are similar to those from Table 4. 
We find a positive and significant effect of older people doing housework on monthly 
wage of younger households. If a woman aged 55 to 59 is doing housework, this is associated 
with a 15.6% increase in monthly wage of younger household members. For women aged 
60-64, this association is 17.1%. For men aged 60-64, this association is 15.9, but it is not 
significant. In Vietnam, it is fairly common that grandparents stay with parents and children. 
Older people can do housework and childcare for adults. Adults can spend more time on 
working or find a wage job. This finding is consistent with finding from Dang et al. (2019) 
that childcare helps to increase wage for parents.    
Table 4. Effect of having a wage job of older people on employment of other household 
members 









Effects of having a wage 
job of women aged 55-59 
on employment of other 
household members 
Number of older people 
having a wage job 
0.0464 -0.1030 0.1423 
(0.182) (0.341) (0.364) 
Older people doing 
housework 
0.0115 0.0250 0.1562* 
(0.031) (0.060) (0.083) 
Effects of having a wage 
job of women aged 60-64 
on employment of other 
household members 
Number of older people 
having a wage job 
0.1354 0.3604 0.3155 
(0.265) (0.491) (0.379) 
Older people doing 
housework 
0.0024 0.0660 0.1709** 
(0.042) (0.080) (0.084) 
Effects of having a wage 
job of men aged 60-64 on 
employment of other 
household members 
Number of older people 
having a wage job 
0.1197 -0.0750 0.0147 
(0.205) (0.293) (0.426) 
Older people doing 
housework 
0.0689 0.1154 0.1585 
(0.065) (0.103) (0.171) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Estimation from the 20014 and 2016 VHLSSs. 
 
3.3. Impact on retirement-aged workers 
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The main objective of the study is to forecast the cost and benefit of extended retirement age 
for women and men. We explore four scenarios as follows: 
- Scenario 1: Increasing the retirement age of women from 55 to 60. The retirement 
age of men is unchanged, at 60. 
- Scenario 2: Increasing the retirement of women from 55 to 60, and the retirement age 
of men from 60 to 62. This scenario is currently proposed by the Ministry of Labor, 
Invalid and Social Affair. 
- Scenario 3: Increasing the retirement of women from 55 to 62, and the retirement age 
of men from 60 to 62. Thus, both men and women at 62. 
- Scenario 4: Increasing the retirement of women from 55 to 65, and the retirement age 
of men from 60 to 65. Thus, both men and women at 65. 
An impact of a program or a policy on a beneficiary group is defined as the difference in 
an outcome of the beneficiary group in the presence of the program and the outcome in the 
absence of the program. In this study, the program is defined as the extension of retirement 
age (four scenarios). The current situation is regarded as the situation in the absence of the 
program. Situations under the four scenarios of retirement age extension are situations in the 
presence of the program. However, these situations are not observed yet. They are called 
counterfactual in the terminology of impact evaluation, and they need to be estimated. Our 
main purpose is to estimate employment and wages of older people if the retirement age is 
extended. 
It should be noted that in this study the policy of extended retirement age has not been 
implemented. Our study only forecasts the potential effect of proposed extension of 
retirement age instead of measuring causality of the extension of retirement age. In traditional 
impact evaluation of a program, the program has been implemented, and the main research 
question is to answer what would happen to the participants in the program if they had not 
participated.   
A key assumption in this study is that employers comply with the extended retirement 
age. This assumption is reasonable for at least the public sector. For the private sector, 
employers might end the contract with the workers before the retirement age and replace 
them with younger workers. However, Kalwij et al. (2010) does not support the hypothesis 
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that employment of the young and old are substitutes and even finds some minor 
complementarities. Older workers in the formal sector have more experienced and skills. If 
the retirement age is increased, older workers are expected to have more incentive to continue 
working and employers are more likely to hire them.  
For our study, when the retirement age is increased, it has a direct effect on people 
who are working in the formal sector. For the informal sector, there are not retirement ages 
applied for them, and there is no effect of the extension of retirement age on this group. For 
illustration of the main idea of impact evaluation, we discuss the estimation method for the 
first scenario (i.e., increasing the retirement age for women from 55 to 60). Under this 
scenario, women aged 55 to 59, who have contributory pensions are affected. We do not 
assume that all these people will have to work if retirement age is extended. Some people 
cannot work because of health and other purposes. There are two questions “How many 
percent of the pensioners would continue to work if the retirement age had been extended to 
60?”, and “If they work, how much they can earn?”.  
Figure 3 presents the description of different groups used in the impact evaluation. 
11.5% of women aged 55 to 59 had contributory pensions in 2016, while 89.5% did not have 
contributory pensions. After retirement, people have three mutually exclusive choices: (i) 
continue to have a wage job (10.5%), (ii) self-employed (33.9%), and (iii) not working 
(55.2%). It shows that the percentage of not working for people with pensions is remarkably 
higher than that for people without pensions.  
For retired people who are still having a wage job, there would be a small effect on 
their working if the retirement age is increased. We assume that there are no effects on this 
group. Thus, the employment effect of retirement age extension is mainly on women in the 
formal sector (who are pensioners in the VHLSSs) and not working after the current 
retirement age. In the VHLS data, they are women who received contributory pensions and 
were not working. In terminology of impact evaluation, the treatment group is women with 
contributory pensions and not working, while the control group is the remaining people 
(Figure 3).  
To estimate the effect of the retirement age extension on employment, we use the 
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The idea is that we find people in 
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the control group who have very similar observed characteristics as the treatment group. 
These similar people are called the matched control group, and their employment can be used 
to ‘mimic’ the employment of the treatment group if the retirement age is extended. To find 
the similar control group, we use the propensity score matching with kernel weights and 
bandwidth of 0.01. We tried several matching estimators including nearest neighbor 
matching, kernel matching and Mahalanobis matching. These methods yield very similar 
results, and we cannot reject the equality of the estimates between methods. In this report, 
we use the results from kernel matching for interpretation. The matching method is discussed 
in more detailed in the Appendix.        
Regarding wages, the extension of retirement age has an effect on women who have 
pensions but not working and those self-employed. In this matching, the treatment group 
consists of matched people in the previous matching step and self-employed people. The 
control group includes wage earners (regardless of having contributory pensions or not).  We 
also use the propensity score matching to find a control group which have similar 
characteristics as the treatment group. We use wages of a matched control group as the proxy 
of wages for the treatment group.  
Table 5 presents the distribution of population by the receipt of contributory pension 
and employment status for female and male. It shows a large difference in the proportion of 
working between pensioners and non-pensioners. This implies that having contributory 
pension can reduce the proportion of working.  
















Not working 3.63 3.4 7.04 1.83 3.55 5.38 
Wage jobs 0.72 0.34 1.06 0.76 1.08 1.84 
Self-employed 2.23 1.61 3.83 1.52 2.34 3.86 
Not having  
pension 
Not working 8.93 10.55 19.48 5.63 6.56 12.19 
Wage jobs 5.43 2.73 8.15 17.02 5.52 22.54 
Self-employed 36.31 24.13 60.44 31.96 22.23 54.19 
 Total 57.24 42.76 100 58.71 41.29 100 























Source: Authors’ preparation 
Table 6 presents the average treatment effect (ATT) of the extension of retirement 
age on employment and wage for male and female. The treatment group has the rate of 
working as well as monthly wage equal to zero. The row ‘unmatched’ reports outcomes of 
treatment and control, and the row ATT reports outcomes of the treatment and matched 
control groups. The matched control group includes individuals those who have similar 
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retirement. In other words, it measures the benefit on employment and wages that the retired 
group could earn if they contribute to work.  
If retirement age is extended to 60 for women, those who are aged 55 to 59 are still 
working in the formal sector. However, not all of them continue to work. The results show 
that 80.3% of them would continue to work, and the average wage for these people is 
estimated to be 5,866.8 thousand VND. 
If the retirement age is extended to 64 for women, 72.3% of women aged 60-64 will 
continue to work. This rate is lower than the rate for women aged 55 to 59, since older people 
face more health problems which can deter them from working. The monthly wage that they 
could earn is also lower, at 3,489 thousand VND.  
The effect of the extension of retirement age is also estimated for men from 60 to 64. 
It is estimated that 78.7% of men continue to work in the formal sector if they do not retire. 
The average wage they could earn is 6,307 thousand VND. This wage is remarkably higher 
than wage of women of the same age. Again, this reflects the gender inequality in wage.   
Table 6. Effect of on working and monthly wage 
Samples Outcome variables Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. 
Women 
aged 55-59 
Have a work 
Unmatched 0 84.4 -84.4*** 2.0 
ATT 0 80.3 -80.3*** 1.8 
Monthly wage 
(thousand VND) 
Unmatched 0 3334.5 -3334.5*** 211.3 
ATT 0 5866.8 -5866.8*** 620.6 
Women 
aged  60-64 
Have a work 
Unmatched 0 74.4 -74.4*** 2.5 
ATT 0 72.3 -72.3*** 2.9 
Monthly wage 
(thousand VND) 
Unmatched 0 3489.0 -3489.0*** 125.9 
ATT 0 5147.0 -5147.0*** 268.4 
Men aged 
60-64 
Have a work 
Unmatched 0 83.8 -83.8*** 2.2 
ATT 0 78.7 -78.7*** 1.7 
Monthly wage 
(thousand VND) 
Unmatched 0 4777.1 -4777.1*** 220.5 
ATT 0 6307.2 -6307.2*** 393.1 
ATT is Average Treatment Effect.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
 
4. Projected benefit of extension of retirement age 
4.1. The benefit of extension of retirement age 
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This section estimates and projects the total benefit and cost of retirement age extension in 
the future. There are four scenarios which are discussed in the previous sections. We use the 
first scenario (retirement age of women is increased to 60) to illustrate the estimation method. 
Firstly, the total benefit is computed as the total wage that women aged 55-59 can earn. This 
total wage is computed using the 2016 VHLSS as follows:  
 Benefit = Not working * Working rate * Wage + Self-employed * Wage,       
where ‘Not working’ is the total number of women aged 55-59 who have contributory 
pension but not working. The working rate is estimated at 80.3% (in Table 14). The monthly 
wage which is estimated equal to 5,866.8 thousand VND (Table 14). The first term of the 
right-hand side of equation (1) measures the benefit for women who are not working under 
early retirement but will work under retirement age extension. ‘Self-employed’ is the total 
number of women aged 55-59 who have contributory pension and are currently self-
employed. This group will continue to have a wage job if the retirement age is extended. For 
other scenarios, the computation method is similar.  
We multiply the monthly wage with 12 to get the total annual wage. Table 15 shows 
that the total benefit under Scenario 1 is 10619.4 billion VND for one year. Table 15 reports 
the benefit and cost in billion VND and also equivalent values in million US$ in parentheses. 
In Scenario 2, the benefit from working of women 55-59 is the same. However, in this 
scenario, the retirement age of men is increased to 62. Men aged 60 and 61 continue to work, 
and they can bring the total wage of 4,595.4 billion VND. In total, the benefit of the second 
scenario is 15,214.9 billion VND. The third scenario has the benefit of 18,309.9 billion VND. 
The fourth scenario has the highest benefit, which is equal to 27,463.2 billion.  
As mentioned, the impact of a program is the difference between the status in the 
presence of the program and the status in the absence of the program. When older people are 
not retired, their benefit of doing housework for younger people is no longer available. The 
previous section shows that wage of adults is around 15% higher when retired people are 
doing housework. The cost of delayed retirement age is estimated by the effect of ‘doing 
housework’ of older people (Table 15) multiplied by the wage of youngers people. We 
assume that when a woman aged 55-59 does not do housework, it reduces wage of an adult 
by 15.2%. For a woman and a man aged 60-64 not doing housework, the wage of a younger 
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is reduced by 17.1% and 15.9%. It should be noted that if there is only one older person 
having a wage job instead of not doing housework, the wage-reducing effect is computed for 
only one younger person. If there are two older people doing a wage job instead of 
housework, the wage-reducing effect is computed for two people, and so on.  
Not all people are not working after retirement. Figure 6 shows that 33.9% of 
pensioners are self-employed, and income from self-employment vanishes if these self-
employed people are not retired. Using the 2016 VHLSS, we estimate that the average wage 
is 62% higher than average self-employed income. Using this information, we can compute 
the total forgone self-employed income for self-employed people. 
Table 7 shows that the cost of not doing housework under Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4 is 
915.6; 12,44.6; 15,79.9; and 2,370.6 billion VND, respectively. The forgone self-
employment income is higher. In Scenarios 1 and 2, this cost is equal to 2,812.0 and 4,139.8 
billion VND, respectively. In Scenarios 3 and 4, the cost is equal to 4,940.1 and 7,473.1 
billion VND, respectively.  
Finally, we can estimate the net benefit of the extension of retirement age as follow:  
   Net Benefit = Benefit – Cost of forgone housework – Forgone self-employed income. 
The net benefit is higher if the age of retirement is higher. Table 10 shows that the net benefit 
of Scenario 1 is 6,891.9 billion VND, equivalent to 0.152% of GDP. The net benefit of 
Scenario 2 is higher, at 9,830.4 billion VND (0.218% of GDP). In Scenario 3, the net benefit 
is equal to at 11,789.8 billion VND (0.262% of GDP). Scenario 4 brings the highest benefit 
at 17,619.5 billion VND (0.391% of GDP) 
Table 7. Cost and benefit of later retirement 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Scenario 1: Women 
retire at 60 
Women retire at 60 10,619.4 915.6 2,812.0 6,891.9 0.153 
  (473.0) (40.8) (125.3) (307.0)  
Scenario 2: Women 
retire at 60, and men 
at 62 
Women retire at 60 10,619.4 915.6 2,812.0 6,891.9 0.153 
 (473.0) (40.8) (125.3) (307.0)  
Men retire at 62 4,595.4 329.0 1,327.9 2,938.6 0.065 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 (204.7) (14.7) (59.1) (130.9)  
Total 15,214.9 1,244.6 4,139.8 9,830.4 0.218 
 (677.7) (55.4) (184.4) (437.9)  
Scenario 3: Both 
women and men 
retire at 62 
Women retire at 62 13,714.5 1,250.9 3,612.3 8,851.3 0.197 
 (610.9) (55.7) (160.9) (394.3)  
Men retire at 62 4,595.4 329.0 1,327.9 2,938.6 0.065 
 (204.7) (14.7) (59.1) (130.9)  
Total 18,309.9 1,579.9 4,940.1 11,789.8 0.262 
 (815.6) (70.4) (220.0) (525.2)  
Scenario 4: Both 
women and men 
retire at 65 
Women retire at 65 17,398.2 1,650.0 4,564.8 11,183.4 0.248 
 (775.0) (73.5) (203.3) (498.1)  
Men retire at 65 10,064.9 720.6 2,908.3 6,436.1 0.143 
 (448.3) (32.1) (129.5) (286.7)  
Total 27,463.2 2,370.6 7,473.1 17,619.5 0.391 
 (1,223.3) (105.6) (332.9) (784.8)  
Note: Figure in parentheses are million USD. The exchange rate in Jan 2016 is 22,450 VND = 1 
USD. 
The benefit and cost are estimated for one year. 
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
 
4.2. Projection of benefit over time 
In this section, we present the projection of benefit over time. We assume that 2016 is the 
first year to implement the extension of retirement age under three scenarios, and we project 
the effect until 2049. This can be considered as the forecast of the net benefit from the first 
year of implementation to 33 years later. For projection, we need two parameters. The first 
parameter is the population of male and female projected until 2049. We use the population 
forecast from General Statistical Office and UNFPA (2016) under the assumption of a middle 
fertility rate. The second parameter is the rate of workers in the formal sector over time. We 
compute the rate of workers in the formal sector using the 2016 VHLSS and assume that this 
rate is constant over time for age cohorts. For example, the rate of formal jobs for women 
aged 60 in 2046 (30 years later from the 2016 VHLSS) will be the same as the rate of formal 
jobs of women aged 30 in the 2016 VHLSS. The formal sector will be expanded for the 
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whole economy, but for the same cohort this rate can decrease as age increases. Thus, we 
assume that these two opposite effects are cancelled out, and we can use the current rate of 
the formal sector to project the future rate for the same age cohort.  
It should be noted that according to the recent proposal of the Ministry of Labor, 
Invalid and Social Affair, the retirement age of women is increased by only 6 months in the 
first year of implementation, then one year in the second year, and 5 years after 10 years. It 
means that women retire at 55.5 years old in the first year of implementation, then 56 in the 
second year, and 60 in the tenth year of implementation. For men, the retirement age is 
extended by four months for each year. It means that men retire at 62 after 6 years of 
implementation.  
Table 8 and Figure 4 present the net benefit of extended retirement age projected over 
time. In the first year, the benefit is small since there is benefit only for women aged 55 or 
men aged 60. Moreover, this benefit is computed for only 6 months for women and 3 months 
for men. The full benefit is computed for women after 10 years and for men after 8 years. 
The benefit is accumulated over years until all people in the age group are working. The 
benefit increases over time, since the number of older people who are still working is higher 
and the share of people having a formal job is increasing. In the year 2049, the benefit of the 
extension of retirement age accounts for 1.21% of GDP in the scenario 1; 1,51% of GDP in 
scenario 2; 1.89% of GDO in scenario 3; and 2.82% in scenario 4. It should be noted that the 
benefit of scenarios 1 to 3 decreases over 2048-2049, since the total population of women 











Table 8. Projected benefit of extended retirement age over time  
Years 
Net income gain (billion VND) Share in GDP (%) 
Scenario 1: 
Women 
retire at 60 
Scenario 2: 
Women 
retire at 60, 














retire at 60 
Scenario 2: 
Women 
retire at 60, 












2016 689.2 1178.9 1178.9 1178.9 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
2017 1427.0 2482.1 2482.1 2482.1 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 
2018 2204.1 3886.5 3886.5 3886.5 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.09 
2019 3027.8 5394.0 5394.0 5394.0 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.12 
2020 3999.4 7265.0 7265.0 7265.0 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 
2021 5026.2 9062.4 9062.4 9062.4 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.20 
2022 6216.9 10577.8 10577.8 10316.8 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.23 
2023 7596.7 12186.2 12186.2 12764.1 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.28 
2024 9091.1 13546.1 13546.1 14867.5 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.33 
2025 10928.2 15429.7 15429.7 16100.0 0.24 0.34 0.34 0.36 
2026 11653.4 16452.8 17119.9 18743.6 0.26 0.37 0.38 0.42 
2027 12419.7 17790.8 18834.6 21453.1 0.28 0.40 0.42 0.48 
2028 13351.0 18725.9 21063.2 24527.1 0.30 0.42 0.47 0.54 
2029 14299.3 19568.4 23269.4 27790.2 0.32 0.43 0.52 0.62 
2030 14874.9 20496.6 24638.6 31426.2 0.33 0.46 0.55 0.70 
2031 16056.0 22186.0 26631.5 34657.4 0.36 0.49 0.59 0.77 
2032 17469.4 23512.7 28041.8 37753.2 0.39 0.52 0.62 0.84 
2033 19062.1 25201.3 30158.0 41944.0 0.42 0.56 0.67 0.93 
2034 21216.5 27952.6 33217.4 46969.4 0.47 0.62 0.74 1.04 
2035 23644.3 30586.1 35994.0 52014.3 0.53 0.68 0.80 1.16 
2036 26144.9 33357.0 39265.9 56021.0 0.58 0.74 0.87 1.24 
2037 28857.9 36179.7 42877.0 60630.9 0.64 0.80 0.95 1.35 
2038 32232.9 39952.6 47425.3 66150.2 0.72 0.89 1.05 1.47 
2039 34898.4 43504.1 51923.5 71653.5 0.78 0.97 1.15 1.59 
2040 37261.1 46075.7 55367.7 76878.8 0.83 1.02 1.23 1.71 
2041 39705.5 48726.1 58820.9 82384.1 0.88 1.08 1.31 1.83 
2042 41916.0 52593.5 63730.0 89241.5 0.93 1.17 1.42 1.98 
2043 43253.3 55299.3 67942.9 95323.8 0.96 1.23 1.51 2.12 
2044 46040.7 58610.2 72157.1 102364.0 1.02 1.30 1.60 2.27 
2045 48965.0 62530.9 76104.9 109949.4 1.09 1.39 1.69 2.44 
2046 51476.6 65350.4 79535.4 116581.9 1.14 1.45 1.77 2.59 
2047 53541.7 67363.6 82450.7 121470.9 1.19 1.50 1.83 2.70 
2048 54957.6 68593.2 84224.2 124550.9 1.22 1.52 1.87 2.77 
2049 54335.3 68139.9 85166.5 126901.0 1.21 1.51 1.89 2.82 
Note: the benefit is measured in the price of Jan 2016. 








Figure 4. Projected benefit of extended retirement age over time 
  
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
We measure the benefit of the retirement age extension as the share of GDP. We 
assume that wage and GDP grow at the same growth rate. Thus, the share of benefit in GDP 
does not depend on the change in GDP and wage. The effect of retirement age extension is 
increased over time because of the increasing population of older and the increasing share of 
formal sector over time. It should be noted that the growth of wages was higher than the 
growth rate during the past years. For example, during the 2014-2016 period, the average 
wage increased by around 10% annually (Table 1), while the GDG growth rate was around 
6% in the same period. Thus, the benefit of the retirement age extension will be larger than 
our projected benefit if the average wage and GDP in the future continue to increase at a 
similar rate as the previous period.      
Table 9 compares the benefit of extended retirement age between men and women. 





























Scenario 1: Women retire at 60
Scenario 2: Women retire at 60, and men at 62
Scenario 3: Both women and men retire at 62
Scenario 4: Both women and men retire at 65
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between women aged 60-64 and men aged 60-64. We estimate the total effect of full 
implementation (i.e., assuming all people aged 60-64 are working since 2016). The total 
benefit from the male aged 60-64 is higher than that from women aged 60-64, since the share 
of working and the wage of male are higher than that of female. However, in the future 
women will have a higher share of working in the formal sector and a higher population size 
(since they have a longer life expectancy). As a result, in the years after 2041 (the 25th year 
after the implementation), the benefit from female is higher than benefit from male (Figure 
10).   
Table 9. Projected benefit of extended retirement age over time for female and male 
Years 













2016 1021.0 1531.2 0.02 0.03 
2017 2092.1 3165.1 0.05 0.07 
2018 3198.6 3996.8 0.07 0.09 
2019 4337.1 5467.1 0.10 0.12 
2020 5498.7 8740.4 0.12 0.19 
2021 5736.8 9151.9 0.13 0.20 
2022 5945.3 9938.1 0.13 0.22 
2023 6124.4 10380.9 0.14 0.23 
2024 6312.0 10836.6 0.14 0.24 
2025 6672.8 10949.3 0.15 0.24 
2026 6991.8 11575.6 0.16 0.26 
2027 7415.8 11939.8 0.16 0.27 
2028 7931.8 12338.4 0.18 0.27 
2029 8436.6 12723.3 0.19 0.28 
2030 9137.0 13417.3 0.20 0.30 
2031 9728.1 14030.1 0.22 0.31 
2032 10353.3 14103.9 0.23 0.31 
2033 11115.1 14784.6 0.25 0.33 
2034 11883.8 15524.1 0.26 0.34 
2035 12341.6 16028.4 0.27 0.36 
2036 13320.8 16555.3 0.30 0.37 
2037 14497.8 17275.2 0.32 0.38 
2038 15822.1 18095.2 0.35 0.40 
2039 17621.1 19134.0 0.39 0.42 
2040 19647.6 19970.0 0.44 0.44 
2041 21734.2 20944.3 0.48 0.47 
2042 24009.2 23316.3 0.53 0.52 
2043 26824.1 25246.4 0.60 0.56 

















2045 31019.1 29965.2 0.69 0.67 
2046 33044.7 32060.7 0.73 0.71 
2047 34882.2 33046.9 0.77 0.73 
2048 35990.7 33602.5 0.80 0.75 
2049 38321.7 34244.1 0.85 0.76 
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
  
Figure 5. Projected benefit of extended retirement age over time for female and male 
  
Source: Estimation from the 2016 VHLSS. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In Vietnam, the retirement age for women and men is 55 and 60, respectively. Yet, there are 
a large proportion of people still working after the retirement age. 78.1% of women aged 55-
59 and 67.4% of women aged 60-64 were still working in 2016. 75.5% of men aged 60-64 































Female aged 60-64 are working Male aged 60-64 are working
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childcare for their children. Given the improved health as well as the increased population of 
older people, it is necessary to consider increasing the retirement age in Vietnam. 
This report examines the effect of extension of retirement age in Vietnam under three 
scenarios: (i) retirement age of women is increased to 60; (ii) retirement age of women is 
increased to 60, and retirement age of men is increased to 62, (iii) retirement age of both 
women and men is increased to 62, (iv) retirement age of both women and men is increased 
to 65.  
If retirement age is increased, people who are working in the formal sector can have 
a longer time of working and can increase their wages. We do not find a significant effect of 
labor market participation of older people on younger people’s employment. This suggests 
that retirement age delay would not affect the labor demand as well as wages for young 
workers. However, working in the formal sector means reduction of housework for their 
families and also forgone self-employment income. The net benefit of the increase in 
retirement age is the total wages that older people can earn minus the cost of not doing 
housework and the forgone self-employment income. The results show that the net benefit 
of Scenario 1 is 6891.9 billion VND, equivalent to 0.152% of GDP. The net benefit of 
Scenario 2 is higher, at 9,830.4 billion VND (0.218% of GDP). In Scenario 3, the net benefit 
is equal to at 11,789.8 billion VND (0.262% of GDP). Scenario 4 brings the highest benefit 
at 17,619.5 billion VND (0.391% of GDP).  
We project the benefit of the extension of retirement age over 33 years to come. The 
benefit is larger over time, since the number of older people is higher and the share of people 
having a formal job is increasing. In the year 2049, the benefit of the extension of retirement 
age accounts for 1.21% of GDP in the scenario 1; 1,51% of GDP in scenario 2; 1.89% of 
GDO in scenario 3; and 2.82% in scenario 4. However, in 2048 and 2049 the benefit of 
scenarios from 1 to 3 decreases, since the total population of women aged 55-64 and men 






Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic 
studies, 58(2), pp.277-297.  
Bertoni, M., & Brunello, G. (2017). Does delayed retirement affect youth employment? 
Evidence from Italian local labour markets. Discussion Paper No. IZA DP No. 10733, IZA 
– Institute of Labor Economics. 
Bertoni, M., & Brunello, G. (2017). Does A Higher Retirement Age Reduce Youth 
Employment. IZA Discussion Paper 10733. 
Boeri, T, Garibaldi, P, Moen, E, 2016, A Clash of Generations? Increase in Retirement Age 
and Labour Demand for Youth, CEPR Discussion Paper 11422, London. 
Böheim, R. (2014). The effect of early retirement schemes on youth employment. IZA world 
of Labor. 
Burtless, G. (2013). The impact of population aging and delayed retirement on workforce 
productivity. 
Dang, H. A., Hiraga, M., & Nguyen, C. V. (2019). Childcare and maternal employment: 
evidence from Vietnam. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (8856).  
Gruber, J and Wise, D. (2010), Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World. 
The Relationship to Youth Employment, University of Chicago Press. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey and H. S. Rosen, 1988. Estimating vector auto regressions with 
panel data. Econometrica, vol. 56; pp. 1371-1395. 
Jousten, A., Lefèbvre, M., Perelman, S., & Pestieau, P. (2010). The effects of early retirement 
on youth unemployment: The case of Belgium. In Social security programs and retirement 
around the world: The relationship to youth employment (pp. 47-76). University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kalwij, A., Kapteyn, A., & De Vos, K. (2010). Retirement of older workers and employment 
of the young. De Economist, 158(4), 341-359. 
29 
 
Munnell, A., & Wu, A. (2013). Do older workers squeeze out younger workers?. Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, (13-011). 
Nguyen, C. V. (2019). Old-Age Pensions in a Lower Middle-Income Country: Economic or 
Psychological Effects?. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/704250. 
Cuong, N. V. (2013). The impact of social security on household welfare: Evidence from a 
transition country. The European Journal of Development Research, 25(5), 737-757. 
Staubli, S., & Zweimüller, J. (2013). Does raising the early retirement age increase 
employment of older workers?. Journal of public economics, 108, 17-32. 
Vestad, O. L. (2013). Early retirement and youth employment in Norway. Statistic Norway. 
Wooldridge, J. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Second edition. 
Yu, H., Cao, J., & Kang, S. (2019). Fertility cost, intergenerational labor division, and 
female employment. CESifo Working Papers, 7293 
Knodel, J., & Nguyen, M. D. (2015). Grandparents and grandchildren: care and support in 
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Ageing & Society, 35(9), 1960-1988. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
